The Neutrality of Switzerland: Deception, Gold, and the Holocaust by McComas, Kyra
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate
Journal of History, Series II
Volume 21 Article 12
2016
The Neutrality of Switzerland: Deception, Gold,
and the Holocaust
Kyra McComas
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives
Part of the History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Historical
Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information,
please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
McComas, Kyra (2016) "The Neutrality of Switzerland: Deception, Gold, and the Holocaust," Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara
University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II: Vol. 21 , Article 12.
Available at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol21/iss1/12
	Historical Perspectives, Series II, Volume XXI, 2016 
	
The Neutrality of Switzerland: Deception, Gold, and the Holocaust 
Kyra McComas 
 
From 1939 to 1945, Europe and Asia saw the deaths of 52 million people 
and the mutilation and displacement of millions more as a result of the Second 
World War. Amidst the carnage however, global commerce and the flow of capital 
continued. Notably, a sum of at least 1.7 billion Swiss francs worth of gold was 
deposited by Germany into the vaults of the Swiss National Bank in Bern. 
Additional unknown amounts from private German deposits of looted gold were 
laundered, making Switzerland one of the world’s wealthiest nations after the war.1 
But how did Switzerland elude the scrutiny of the international community? This 
essay seeks to illustrate how Switzerland’s image of neutrality has been 
maintained, despite its complicity during the war, because of its history and 
political and economic factors. I will further argue that Swiss complicity was a 
decisive factor in the prolonged success of the Third Reich’s murder machine, 
bestowing partial responsibility on Switzerland for the Holocaust and undermining 
the myth of Swiss “neutrality.” 
 
A History of Neutrality and Protection 
The notion of Switzerland’s neutrality is grounded in its history as a 
protecting power. Swiss neutrality was formally recognized in 1648 under the 
Peace of Westphalia and renewed at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Seven 
centuries of cooperation between Romansh, French, Alemannic, and Italian 
cultures, with four principal languages and three religions, makes Switzerland 
unique in European history. Such coexistence has been far from multicultural 
however, as there is little cross-cultural engagement, yet Switzerland’s national 
identity is rooted in their alliance and neutrality. In other words, they avoid conflict 
among themselves by eschewing global conflict. As such, at least prior to World 
War II, Switzerland embraced a policy of neutrality that removed it from the 
international arena. As André Gorz interpreted it, denial of existing conflicts 
indicated no international actuality. Yet if the war did nothing else to Switzerland’s 
global image, it certainly modified the understanding of neutrality, refocusing it on 
																																																						
1	Jean Ziegler, The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1997).	
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furthering peace and preventing evasion of responsibility via moral indifference. 
The latter definition has been associated with pacifism (with a reservation on self-
defense) and mediation.2 Importantly, neither definition includes neutrality in the 
banking or financial sector.  
Switzerland exploited the former definition of neutrality to justify its lack of 
confrontational involvement in World War II, by side-stepping the war and the 
atrocities and unofficially providing aid for one side or the other. Ironically, 
assistance is exactly what they provided by laundering German plunder. They 
effectively used the narrative of neutrality to obscure their war-time actions. 
Today, the second definition is used to support the claim that they simply, 
mediated economic exchanges, which carried on despite the war and were crucial 
to the rest of the world, especially the other non-belligerent countries.  
As an international protecting power leading up to and during the war, 
Switzerland had three primary roles: repatriating captives, transferring grants-in-
aid, and visiting prisoner camps (in league with the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, headquartered in Geneva).3 Switzerland had demonstrated its 
dedication to these functions and was thus heavily favored and trusted by the 
international community, evidenced by its protective representation of at least 
thirty-five nations on the eve of the war.4 Although commendable, this does not 
excuse Swiss assistance to Hitler or the subsequent post-war suppression 
complicity. The Red Cross never issued a public appeal for the Jewish Holocaust 
victims,5 claiming that protestation would “produce a stiffening of the indicted 
country’s attitude with regard to the Committee, even the rupture of relations with 




3 Milford Bateman, “International Committee of the Red Cross,” in Modern Genocide: The 
Definitive Resource and Document Collection, Vol. 1: Armenian Genocide, Bosnian Genocide, 
and Cambodian Genocide, eds. Paul R. Bartrop and Steven Leonard Jacobs (Santa Barbara: 
ABC-CLIO, 2015), 275. 
4 Ziegler, The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead. 
5 Paul R. Bartrop, "Holocaust International Reaction," in Modern Genocide: The Definitive 
Resource and Document Collection, Vol. 3: The Holocaust and Kurdish Genocide, eds. Paul R. 
Bartrop and Steven Leonard Jacobs (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2015), 1130. 
6 International Committee of the Red Cross, Report of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross on Its Activities During the Second World War, September 1, 1939 – June 30, 1947, vol. 1 
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Faith in Swiss diplomacy to protect national interests extended to capital 
interests as well. Long chosen as a repository for unstable countries’ finances, 
Switzerland appeared as the best option for the safekeeping of Jewish funds and 
valuables, especially with the rise of Nazism. The Swiss National Bank encouraged 
such deposits by fortifying banking secrecy laws in 1934 to ensure client 
anonymity.7 Who would have suspected that these same protective protocols would 
be exploited to conceal nefarious transactions with the Third Reich? 
 
Economic Crisis and the Failure of the Gold Standard 
On a more objective level, the Swiss had a very real obligation to the global 
economy. With the failure of the gold standard and the post-World War I economic 
downturn, Switzerland’s significant role in the international market was not just a 
matter of maintaining the Swiss national image, but was also crucial for the 
recovery of the global economy and the continuance of foreign exchange. The 
Swiss franc showed remarkable resilience in the aftermath of the war. It became 
one of the first European currencies to attain its pre-war parity in 1924 and 
prompted Switzerland to attempt to restore the gold standard. The Swiss franc was 
the only currency accepted worldwide and was thus crucial to stable foreign 
exchange, which continued despite wartime hardships. With the Swiss franc 
relatively unscathed, the Swiss global economic presence was enhanced.8 
 
Gold Laundering in the Context of War 
Switzerland’s monetary history provided latitude for the Swiss National 
Bank (SNB) to orchestrate its dealings with the Third Reich amidst the context of 
wartime economics, politics, and militancy. One defense of the World War II gold 
transactions between the SNB and the German Reichsbank is that the Swiss were 
																																																																																																																																																																														
(1948), 21, quoted in Samantha Power, A Problem From Hell (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 
34. 
7 Institute of the World Jewish Congress, “The Sinister Face of ‘Neutrality’: The Role of Swiss 
Financial Institutions in the Plunder of European Jewry,” PBS Frontline, 1996, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/nazis/readings/sinister.html (accessed 30 Oct. 
2015). 
8 Vincent Crettol and Patrick Halbeisen, “Monetary Policy Background to the Gold Transactions 
of the Swiss National Bank in the Second World War,” Swiss National Bank Report (1999). 
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fearful of German invasion and attack. However, such an invasion would have 
been unlikely, given Germany’s limitations on means of payment for their wartime 
imports. The SNB was the only willing acceptor of gold in exchange for Swiss 
francs, which importantly, were freely exchanged across the international market.9 
Thus, the German economy relied on their exchange policy with the Swiss in order 
to pay other countries for raw material imports that were crucial to the German war 
effort. A memorandum from the German Reichsbank’s Ministerial Director 
Clodius evidences the belief that the Swiss were their only hope. He wrote, 
“Switzerland represents our only means of obtaining freely disposable foreign 
exchange,” and confirmed this with the president of the Reichsbank, Reich 
Minister Funk.10 This raises the question of Switzerland’s essential role in the 
longevity of the Third Reich. 
From 1939 to three weeks before Hitler’s suicide in April, 1945, the Swiss 
gold-laundering machine exchanged gold from the German Reichsbank for 1.7 
billion Swiss francs. The gold was deposited in bank vaults at Bern and was 
laundered via purported “triangular transactions.” In this system, Germany 
deposited looted gold in the SNB in exchange for Swiss francs, which they 
subsequently used to purchase war materials from Turkey, Portugal, Sweden, 
Spain, and other non-allied nations. These nations’ banks then used the Swiss 
francs to pay for gold from Switzerland, the same gold for which the Swiss had 
exchanged these very Swiss francs. Moreover, these nations could claim 
legitimacy for their gold purchases, which were strictly through “neutral” 
Switzerland, as part of the normal flow of foreign trade.11 Essentially, Switzerland 
functioned as the middleman. But was such “mediation” de facto benign? 
The SNB continues to project its image of the “neutral banker” today. It 
denies the implications of “triangular transaction,” emphasizing its commitment to 
the gold standard and its resulting guarantee to accept any gold it is offered. It also 
claims that Germany certainly had its own gold reserves (that were not looted) as 
well as legally acquired gold from Austria and Czechoslovakia, and this was the 
gold involved in the transactions. Interestingly, the Swiss never mandated evidence 
of the legality of the German gold, perhaps in an effort to maintain their neutrality 
																																																						
9Ibid. 
10 Ziegler, The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead, 47. 
11 Ibid. 
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by not being certain of the moral nature of the material they transacted.12 Their 
function in the world market would be heavily undermined if it was discovered 
they knew of the illicit nature of the gold, expunging their “neutral” front. But even 
ignorance does not abrogate responsibility. 
Chairman Ernst Weber, Alfred Hirs, and Paul Rossy constituted the 
executive board of the SNB throughout the war. They continually referenced 
“neutrality” to manipulate and aggrandize the term in their argument for 
justification. They also called on the Swiss bank traditions of secrecy and clientele 
loyalty, which were paramount to their exchanges with Germany, primarily 
through Emil Puhl.13 
The dismal state of the German economy was a major factor in how Puhl 
would negotiate with the gold barons in Bern. In a letter to Hitler on January 7, 
1939, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Board of the Reichsbank, elucidated 
the poor state of German finances, stating, “No increase in the production of goods 
can be achieved by increasing the amount of paper money.”14 The German 
dependence on foreign wartime materials mandated the need for a banker, but 
Schacht’s request for increased Reichsbank control did not please Hitler, who 
turned to Puhl for management of German funds.15 Unlike Schacht, Puhl was not a 
danger to Hitler’s authority, and was a friend and business partner of Weber, Hirs, 
and Rossy. “He played like a virtuoso on the Swiss neutrality myth,” and astutely 
assuaged their consciences with their own “neutrality” ploy to justify their 
dealings. 16 
Pervasive Anti-Semitism 
The manipulation of historic labels was not the only justification 
successfully employed by the Germans: anti-Semitism was a notable and 
ubiquitous ideology. After the war, the American Jewish Committee asserted, 




14 Hjalmar Schacht, “Confidential Reichsbank Matter” letter from the President of the Board of 
the Reichsbank to the Führer and Reich Chancellor, Berlin (January 1939), in Ziegler, The Swiss, 
the Gold, and the Dead, 38. 
15 Ziegler, The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead, 39. 
16 Ziegler, The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead, 42. 
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anti-Semitism and was receptive to the anti-Jewish teachings of Hitlerism.”17 
Switzerland was no exception. As a historic amalgam of communes and regions, 
Switzerland was not a traditional nation-state. Xenophobia would become a 
prominent feature of the Swiss Confederation. With such a prejudicial notion 
already enmeshed in the nation, it is no surprise that anti-Semitism caught on so 
easily. Due especially to the potency of Joseph Goebbels’s propaganda machine 
and the inspirational rhetoric espoused by Hitler, anti-Semitism was readily 
integrated into the zeitgeist of countless European countries. Anti-Semitism 
became an official policy. A 1938 law mandating a “J” to be stamped onto the 
passports of German Jews and the refusal to allow Jews to enter Switzerland as 
refugees are two among many anti-Semitic actions undertaken by the Swiss 
government.18 
A 1998 study of Swiss World War II camps confirmed the prevalence of 
Swiss anti-Semitism. In these camps, Jewish refugees were often forced to work 
with little to no pay under harsh and cruel conditions and were subjected to a 
“special Jew-tax,” which other non-Jewish refugees were not required to pay. 
Families were frequently torn apart as children were separated from their parents 
and “adopted” by Christian families who supposedly (and perhaps genuinely) 
wanted to help. The British Foreign Office declassified records revealing that 80 to 
98 percent of the camps’ inmates were Jewish, suggesting that they were intended 
expressly for Jews.19 
The potency of the anti-Semitism, which would infiltrate Swiss mentality 
and be used to legitimize actions such as looting, is evidenced in the writings of 
Austrian cabinetmaker Felix Landau. While on the Russian campaign, his faith in 
Germany and his admiration of the Wermacht and Hitler were deepened. He 
described how the “Ukrainians had done a pretty good job plundering. [But] they 
had really thought they were the masters,” until they saw the power of the German 
																																																						
17 Joseph M. Proskauer, “The American Jewish Committee: Statement to The Anglo-American 
Committee of Inquiry,” World Affairs 109, no. 1 (1946), 19. 
18 Ziegler, The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead. 
19 John-Thor Dahlburg, “Jews Mistreated in Swiss WWII Camps, Study Says,” Los Angeles 
Times (Los Angeles, CA), January 13, 1998. 
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forces. 20 His arrogance and confidence in Germany reflects broader European anti-
Semitism which nurtured a sense of identity which pitted the supposedly good, the 
non-Jewish supporters of Hitler’s leadership and Nazism against the repulsive Jew. 
For Landau, sparing the Jews was unthinkable. Tellingly, he believed that the 
major in charge of his battalion was an imbecile because “his actions [were] a 
danger to the state. Take his remark that the Jews fall under the protection of the 
German Wehrmacht. Who could have thought such a thing possible? That’s no 
National Socialist.”21 Understanding the prevailing anti-Semitic culture and 
indoctrination helps explain why the Swiss may have ignored the ethical 
implications of laundering Nazi gold. 
Consequently, rampant anti-Semitism legitimized the theft of Jewish 
possessions such as art, gold, and capital. At a time when one could be “arrested 
for having an anti-German attitude,” looting Jewish people and property became a 
method of conveying German power and supremacy. 22 This translated at the 
national level, wherein acceptance of Jewish loot was not only condoned, but was 
encouraged, as in the case of the SNB. Greed, perhaps even more so than anti-
Semitism, drove people to willingly plunder. One German police official noted 
“that people today give a false impression when they say that the actions against 
the Jews were carried out unwillingly. There was great hatred against the Jews; it 
was revenge, and they wanted money and gold.”23 And much of this loot was then 
sent to Swiss banks for safekeeping. 
 
International Response, or Lack Thereof 
While Swiss covertness proved successful during the war, how were they 
able to continue avoiding responsibility once the war ended and the international 
community turned to judgment? The most obvious answer comes from the context 
of war. The overwhelming economic, political, and cultural upheaval of World 
War II and the extent of human loss was more than enough to overshadow the 
																																																						
20 Felix Landau, Once Again I’ve Got to Play General to the Jews (personal diary), quoted in The 
Good Old Days, eds. Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, and Volker Riess (New York: The Free Press, 
1991), 93. 
21 Ibid., 95. 
22 Ibid., 101. 
23 “A Police Official from Neu-Sandez Grenzpolizeikommissariat (Cracow District/General-
Gouvernement),” in The Good Old Days, 76. 
7
McComas: The Neutrality of Switzerland
Published by Scholar Commons, 2016
		89	
relatively petty monetary crimes of the Swiss (who were notably not directly 
involved in the killings or atrocities of the Holocaust). Still, the Washington 
negotiations that were held in 1946 to hold the Swiss accountable for looted and 
laundered gold and dormant accounts were meant to serve due justice, but even 
those fell short. As Ziegler notes, “The Swiss vanquished the victors of World War 
II.”24 
The main reason for the ineffectiveness of the 1946 Washington Agreement 
was its lack of evidence and objectivity. The United States made the mistake of 
leveling preposterous claims against Switzerland, blaming them for organizing 
Operation Odessa and personal theft of central European banks. Plus, there was no 
physical list detailing all the Nazi transactions with Swiss banks.25 Such overt 
disregard for and exaggeration of actual transgressions facilitated Swiss evasion. 
Swiss representative Walter Stucki capitalized on such absurdities and 
deliberately manipulated the course of the accords, creating compromises that 
favored the Swiss. In addition to the emotional nature of the negotiations was the 
stress of the looming Cold War and the perceived threat of communism to the 
Western world. This became a far higher priority for American foreign affairs than 
obtaining justice for the victims of the war. In the end, Switzerland agreed to pay 
250 million Swiss francs as the final settlement of all claims relating to the 
laundering of Nazi gold. Stucki exploited the language of altruism by shrewdly 
labeling this as “Switzerland’s voluntary contribution to the reconstruction of 
Europe,” injecting the reparations with neutral undertones and reifying a positive 
Swiss global image. 26 Stucki’s success in defying the victorious Allies at the 
Washington Agreement and avoiding responsibility for war-time atrocities lasted 
for nearly fifty years. It was not until the World Jewish Congress finally forced the 
reopening of dormant Jewish accounts, which they later documented at 
$1,297,240,126 attributed to 457,100 Jewish descendent claimants.27 
The pardoning of Swiss gold laundering was also predicated on the fact that 
there were dormant accounts in other European countries, the United States, and 
Israel. If the international community condemned the Swiss for hiding and 
																																																						
24 Ziegler, 193. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 184. 
27 Swiss Bank Claims, Holocaust Victim Assets Litigation, 2014, case no. CV 96-4849. 
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benefiting from dormant accounts, they would subsequently have to recognize their 
own financial profiteering. In other words, plenty of other nations were guilty of 
similar dealings. Hence, the origins of personally beneficial funds (that functioned 
to augment global image and presence) became a null point of condemnation for 
the Swiss. Other nations, especially the United States, which dominated the 
Washington Agreement, had their own greedy motivations.28 In fact, between 1939 
and 1945, the Allies exchanged substantially more gold with the SNB than did the 
Reichsbank. The United States sold 2.242 million francs worth of gold, and France 
and Great Britain sold even more at 189 million francs and 673 million francs, 
respectively. This was largely as a result of the growing importance of the Swiss 
franc in international trade, attesting to the fact that gold had become the most 
important form of payment by 1941. Moreover, just as they employed a neutrality 
argument for their dealings with Germany, the Swiss did the same in accepting 
blocked gold in the United States since Swiss francs had become so vital.29 
With money as a major motivator, the Allies wanted to benefit from their 
holdings as much as the Swiss, so they had to be cautious of how they accused the 
Swiss. Thus, the focus of the debates at the Washington Agreement was on “the 
symbolic issues... such as whether governments and companies are willing to 
acknowledge their responsibility as beneficiaries from or collaborators with the 
Nazi regime.”30 But because of the successful secrecy of SNB actions and its 
policy of confidentiality, most evidence for supporting an ethical case against 
direct Swiss dealings with the Nazis (thereby implicating themselves as 
accomplices in genocide) was highly censored and effectively hidden. 
 
Swiss Fear of a Faltering National Image 
While Switzerland may have evaded just international scrutiny, they faced a 
looming identity crisis. The historical narrative of neutrality had long been 
essential to Swiss self-perception; to avoid a plight around national identity, the 
Swiss could not afford to allow such a narrative to be unraveled and doubted. The 
																																																						
28 Regula Ludi, “Waging War on Wartime Memory: Recent Swiss Debates on the Legacies of 
the Holocaust and the Nazi Era,” Jewish Social Studies 10, no. 2 (2004), 116-152. 
29 Robert Vogler, “The Swiss National Bank's Gold Transactions with the German Reichsbank 
from 1939 to 1945,” Swiss National Bank Report (1984). 
30 Ludi, “Waging War on Wartime Memory,” 117. 
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Washington Agreement enabled Switzerland to transform itself from a Nazi 
accomplice into an esteemed member of Western democracy, largely for economic 
reasons. Once again, global politics played a key role, since Zurich, Basel, and 
Geneva were pivotal financial centers in the fight against communism. This 
heavily benefited the West: the United States knew it was to their advantage to 
appease the Swiss in the interest of the future global economy and trade. Thus, 
they arguably allowed themselves to be beguiled by Stucki and the other cunning 
Swiss representatives.31 This reassurance and reinstatement as a respected member 
of the free world may have prevented the complete shattering of Swiss national 
identity. 
Interestingly, the Swiss have been paradoxically bound together by modern 
controversies regarding their wartime position, with national pride in armed 
neutrality dominating any moral disgust in their economic service to the Third 
Reich. Both sides accounted for the German sparing of Switzerland from invasion 
to independent Swiss activity for its own survival, essentially reinforcing the 
historical image of self-preservation as a defensive confederation. 32 The Swiss 
laundering case reveals how fear drives history, as the Swiss were motivated by a 
genuine fear of losing economic prestige as well as the moral high ground they 
held as a soft power. Such fears contributed to the national identity struggle, which 
inevitably failed to fully manifest thanks to a potent, albeit falsified, narrative of 
national, yet purportedly neutral, heroics. 
 
The Problematic Confines of Bifurcated Guilt and Complicity 
The issue with Switzerland’s “neutrality” emerges in political labeling: they 
are officially equivocal regarding the war. Ludi contends that “the government 
endorses the reinterpretation of Swiss history of the Nazi era... [and 
simultaneously] rejects the legal responsibility this shift would entail.”33 In an 
effort to support the reevaluation of their history with Nazi Germany, the Swiss 
parliament established the Independent Commission of Experts (ICE) in 1996 to 
officially investigate the dormant accounts. Importantly, however, the 2002 final 
																																																						
31 Ziegler, The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead. 
32 Ludi, “Waging War on Wartime Memory.” 
33 Ibid., 135. 
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report did not receive much media response, indicating the waning interest in 
wartime history.34 This reveals the deeper challenge of objective analyses of 
genocide as it gets farther away in memory, which is exacerbated by the tendency 
of post-genocidal silencing. It also suggests the decrease of Swiss global presence, 
since Switzerland seems less financially powerful with growing unemployment 
and bankruptcy claims by major Swiss companies; they have shown vulnerability 
to international market fluctuations, becoming financially more like other 
European nations. 
In turn, this gives Switzerland some flexibility to redefine their international 
image despite their past transgressions. Claims lose potency as events fade into 
history and historians must be cognizant of this when evaluating key historical 
events, especially complex ones such as the Holocaust. Relying on a binary 
narrative of “guilt” only hampers attempts to sift through historical complexities. It 
is crucial to note the genuine Swiss honesty and altruism that has existed in 
dialogue with the deviance. As a Swiss native, Ziegler suggests that the vast 
majority of Swiss people “harbor but one ambition, that of fulfilling in the world 
an active role characterized by humanity and solidarity with other nations.”35 
Internal anger also evidences the diversity of Swiss intentions, far from being one 
homogenized, greedy ideology. Cash, a leading Swiss financial organ, blatantly 
denounced the greed and lies of the SNB, printing one headline stating, “But for 
Switzerland’s gold turntable, the war in Europe would have ended much sooner.”36 
An important note here is that such decrial waited until 1996 to be heard, 
reinforcing the successful evasion from condemnation immediately following the 
war. 
Aside from problematizing binary guilt labeling, this internal anger 
simultaneously raises concerns about the role of complicity. While such local 
Swiss differences do not condone the actions of the SNB as a Nazi accomplice, 
they blame the endurance of the Third Reich solely on Swiss aid. Fifty years after 
the Holocaust, the international community rallied behind these accusations, 
legitimized internally by the Swiss. But did this not also transform Switzerland into 
a scapegoat to assuage the broader international community’s guilt about the 
																																																						
34 Ibid. 
35 Ziegler, The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead, 266. 
36 Quoted in Ziegler, The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead, 7. 
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Holocaust? The United States certainly capitalized on this opportunity to distract 
from its own responsibilities; it was an opportunity to call for Swiss justice without 
bringing attention to American financial offenses during the war. Thus, the notion 
of collective guilt becomes relevant in light of dormant Jewish accounts both in the 
United States and Switzerland (among other countries). But there is still the 
problem of how complicity actually implicates nations in assuming responsibility 
for the Holocaust. While the Swiss may have prolonged the Holocaust and the 
survival of the Third Reich, challenging the narrative of neutrality, the lack of 
direct killing separates them from the Nazis on the spectrum of guilt. At the same 
time, acknowledging the spectral nature of guilt does not pardon any nation from 
their responsibility to humanity. The atrocities of genocide demand robust 
international response such that complicity or claims of “neutrality” cannot 
abrogate responsibility. This is a matter not of economics or politics, but one of 
morality, whereby our humanity implicates us should we ignore injustices against 
our fellow human beings. 
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